NO, this is not going to be some dreary piece on the philosophy of law — but it does have to do with the spirit of the law, particularly the intendment of the constitutional provision on academic freedom. Thanks to a robust interpretation of this dimension of human freedom by the Supreme Court, we do not lag behind other jurisdictions that have recognized it and applied it to controversies, one of the latest of which was Pimentel v. Legal Education Board — both the main decision and the resolution disposing of the motions for reconsideration filed by the contending parties.

One necessary starting point is the recognition that the right is justiciable — it can be claimed before and enforced by the courts. And the Supreme Court has not dealt with academic freedom in niggardly fashion. Aside from accepting the classic formulation of Justice Frankfurter — the freedom to decide what to teach, who to teach, how to teach and who should teach — the Court has dwelt on other facets, recognizing, principally that academic freedom includes two freedoms, actually: there is the freedom of the scholar to conduct research and study, and to publish and disseminate the results of his research, on the one hand, and institutional academic freedom on the other that the 1987 Constitution guarantees all institutions of higher education.