WHEN then President Barack Obama announced his Pivot to Asia policy, this writer in his first contribution to this column wondered how much of a pivot it would be given that US vital interests were involved in crises taking place in the Middle East and Europe. There have been analysts who now blame the Pivot to Asia for the failure of the Obama administration to make a decent job of addressing those crises. It seems that appreciation of the Pivot, or non-appreciation of it, depends on where the analyst is coming from.
The problem with the Pivot was that it occurred somewhat late in the second term of the Obama administration. Aggravating the time factor was the virtual impossibility for the Obama administration to move anything on a fast track after both houses of Congress fell to Republican hands. When the Obamas turned over the keys to the White House to the Trumps, the pillars of the Pivot had barely been set up and stood on shaky ground indeed. The Pivot, under its first pillar, sought to strengthen and expand US alliances in the Indo-Pacific region. The US entered into enhancing defense cooperation agreements with the Philippines and Australia, providing for the rotational deployment of US forces in the latter's military bases. Had funds allowed it, the US might have permanently stationed its forces in the Philippines once again. In the Philippines at least, the project had barely left the planning stage when the Obama administration ended.
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